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1 Introduction
The core of an economy is defined as the set of allocations which cannot be blocked by
any coalition. Thus, the veto mechanism that defines the core implicitly assumes that
individuals are not forward-looking. However, one may ask whether an objection or veto
is credible or, on the contrary, not consistent enough so other agents in the economy may
react to it and propose an alternative or counter-objection.
The first outcome of this two-step conception of the veto mechanism was the work by
Aumann and Maschler (1964), who introduced the concept of bargaining set, containing
the core of a cooperative game.1 This original concept of bargaining set was later adapted
to atomless economies by Mas-Colell (1989). The main idea is to inject a sense of
credibility and stability to the veto mechanism, hence permitting the implementation of
some allocations which otherwise would be formally blocked, although in a non-credible
way. Thus, only objections without counter-objections are considered as credible or
justified, and consequently, blocking an allocation becomes more difficult.
In the case of pure exchange economies with a finite number of traders, the set of
Walrasian allocations is a strict subset of the core which is also strictly contained in the
bargaining set. Under conditions of generality similar to those required in Aumann’s
(1964) core-Walras equivalence theorem, Mas-Colell (1989) showed that the bargaining
set and the competitive allocations coincide for continuum economies. These equivalence
results provide foundations for the Walrasian market equilibrium and, at the same time,
bring up the question of whether there are analogies in economies with a large, but finite
number of agents. A classical contribution in this direction is the one by Debreu and
Scarf (1963), who stated a first formalization of Edgeworth’s (1881) conjecture, showing
that the core and the set of Walrasian allocations become arbitrarily close whenever a
finite economy is replicated a sufficiently large number of times. However, in contrast to
the Debreu-Scarf core convergence theorem, the work by Anderson, Trockel and Zhou
(1997), ATZ from now on, proved that the Mas-Colell bargaining set does not shrink to
the set of Walrasian allocations in a sequence of replicated economies as the core does.
The non-convergence ATZ’s example highlights a weakness of the adaptation of Mas-
Colell’s bargaining set notion for finite economies; roughly speaking, this is basically due
to the fact that the concept of a justified objection is very stringent. To be precise, if a
coalition with a justified objection includes only part of some type of agents then it is not
possible for these agents to strictly improve at the objection. Exploiting this demanding
property, that comes from the ATZ reading of Mas-Collel’s (1989) bargaining set for
1Maschler (1976) discussed the advantages that the bargaining set has over the core.
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finite economies, we revisit the aforementioned example by ATZ and state an alternative
and simple non-convergence proof.
In this paper, we introduce a concept, which we call justified∗ objection, that avoids
the above stringent requirement for an objection to be credible. In this way, we provide
a reformulation of the bargaining set that allows us to obtain a convergence result under
the assumption that the Walrasian correspondence is continuous. Moreover, we state an
example that establishes the impossibility of dropping the continuity hypothesis.
The necessity of the continuity of the equilibrium mapping imposes a limitation to our
convergence result. However, we find conditions on the primitives of the original finite
economy that ensure the required continuity property holds and therefore guarantee
that our convergence theorem remains true. These conditions leads to uniqueness of
equilibrium for the set of economies where the continuity is assumed. We remark that
this is the case of the ATZ’s example for which our bargaining set shrinks to the unique
Walrasian allocation.
The rest of the work is structured as follows. In Section 2 we collect notations and
preliminaries. In Section 3, we introduce a notion of bargaining set and point out the main
differences with Mas-Colell’s definition. In Section 4, we analyze convergence properties
of our bargaining set. In order to facilitate the reading of the paper, the proofs of the
results are contained in a final Appendix.
2 Preliminaries and notations
Let E be an exchange economy with a finite set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, who trade a
finite number ` of commodities. Each consumer i has a preference relation %i on the
consumption set IR`+, with the properties of continuity, convexity
2 and strict monotonicity.
Then, preferences are represented by utility functions Ui, i ∈ N. Let ωi ∈ IR`++ be the
endowments of consumer i. So the economy is E = (IR`+,%i, ωi, i ∈ N).
An allocation x is a consumption bundle xi ∈ IR`+ for each agent i ∈ N. The allocation
x is feasible in the economy E if ∑ni=1 xi ≤∑ni=1 ωi. A price system is an element of the
(` − 1)-dimensional simplex of IR`+. A Walrasian equilibrium is a pair (p, x), where p is
a price system and x is a feasible allocation such that, for every agent i, the bundle xi
maximizes Ui in the budget set Bi(p) = {y ∈ IR`+ such that p · y ≤ p · ωi}. We denote by
2The convexity of preferences we require is the following: If a consumption bundle z is strictly
preferred to zˆ so is the convex combination λz + (1− λ)zˆ for any λ ∈ (0, 1). This convexity property is
weaker than strict convexity and it holds, for instance, when the utility functions are concave.
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W (E) the set of Walrasian allocations for the economy E .
A coalition is a non-empty set of consumers. An allocation y is said to be attainable
or feasible for the coalition S if
∑
i∈S yi ≤
∑
i∈S ωi. Let x ∈ IR`n+ be a feasible allocation
in E . The coalition S blocks x if there exists an allocation y which is attainable for S,
such that yi %i xi for every i ∈ S and yj j xj for some j ∈ S. When S blocks x via y
we say that (S, y) is an objection to x. A feasible allocation is efficient if it is not blocked
by the grand coalition, formed by all the agents. The core of the economy E , denoted by
C(E), is the set of feasible allocations which are not blocked or objected by any coalition
of agents. It is known that, under the hypotheses above, the economy E has Walrasian
equilibrium and that any Walrasian allocation belongs to the core (in particular, it is
efficient).
Along this paper, we will refer to sequences of replicated economies. For each positive
integer r, the r-fold replica economy rE of E is a new economy with rn agents indexed
by ij, j = 1, . . . , r, such that each consumer ij has a preference relation %ij=%i and
endowments ωij = ωi. That is, rE is a pure exchange economy with r agents of type i
for every i ∈ N. Given a feasible allocation x in E let rx denote the corresponding equal
treatment allocation in rE , which is given by rxij = xi for every j ∈ {1, . . . , r} and i ∈ N.
In addition, we will use the fact that, regarding Walrasian equilibria, a finite economy
E with n consumers is equivalent to a continuum economy Ec with n-types of agents
as we specify below. Given the finite economy E , let Ec be the associated continuum
economy, where the set of agents is I = [0, 1] =
⋃n
i=1 Ii, with Ii =
[
i−1
n
, i
n
)
if i 6= n; In =[
n−1
n
, 1
]
; and all the agents in the subinterval Ii are of the same type i. In this case,
x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a Walrasian allocation in E if and only if the step function fx (defined
by fx(t) = xi for every t ∈ Ii) is a competitive allocation in Ec.
3 Bargaining sets for finite economies
The core does not assess the “credibility” of the objections; any attainable allocation
which is blocked by a coalition is dismissed. The argument that objections might be met
with counter-objections leads to bargaining set notions that depend on the way justified
or credible objections are defined.
Since the original bargaining set notion was introduced by Aumann and Maschler
(1964) for cooperative games, several versions have been defined and studied. More
specifically, Mas-Colell’s (1989) bargaining set may be defined for finite economies and,
in this case, it can be larger than the core (see example in Section 6 in Mas-Colell, 1989).
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Next, we present both Mas Colell’s definition of bargaining set for a finite economy
E and ours (respectively named BMC(E) and B(E) hereafter), highlighting the main
differences between both concepts. For it, given A,B ⊆ N, we denote by A \ B the set
of agents that are in A and not in B.
3.1 Mas-Colell’s bargaining set
An objection (S, y) to the allocation x has a counter-objection in the economy E if there
exists a coalition T and an attainable allocation z for T such that
(i) zi i yi for every i ∈ T ∩ S and
(ii zi i xi for every i ∈ T \ S.
An objection which cannot be counter-objected is said to be justified.
BMC(E) is the set of all the feasible allocations in the economy E which, if they are
objected (or blocked), could also be counter-objected.
3.2 Our bargaining set
An objection (S, y) to the allocation x in the initial economy E is counter-objected in the
replicated economy rE if there exist a set of types T ⊂ N, an equal treatment allocation
(zi, i ∈ T ) and natural numbers ni ≤ r, i ∈ T , such that
(i)
∑
i∈T nizi ≤
∑
i∈T niωi and
(ii) zi i yi for every i ∈ T ∩ S and zi i xi for every i ∈ T \ S.
We say that an objection is justified∗ if it is not counter-objected in any replicated
economy. A feasible allocation belongs to B(E) if it has no justifed* objection.
Consider that a coalition S blocks the allocation x in the economy E via y. Note that
if y is not in the core of the economy restricted to S then there is a subcoalition Sˆ ⊂ S
that is able to attain an allocation z such that zi i yi for every i ∈ Sˆ. Then, without
loss of generality, we can consider only objections that assign the same utility level to
members of the same type. This point allows us to consider our definition of bargaining
set in the sequence of replicated economies. To simplify, in the sequence of replicated
economies we restrict the objecting mechanism to equal-treatment allocations.3 That is,
an objection to rx in the replicated economy rE is justied* if it has the equal-treatment
3We remark that restricting the objection process to equal treatment allocations makes more diffi-
cult to have justified objections and then the convergence of the bargaining sets we define implies the
convergence when objections are not required to be equal treatment allocations.
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property and it is not counter-objected in any replicated economy. Also by convexity,
we consider without loss of generality equal-treatment allocations for counter-objecting.
Next we characterize justified∗ objections as Walrasian objections.4 To be precise, an
objection (S, y) to the allocation x in the economy E is said to be Walrasian if there
exists a price system p such that (i) p · v ≥ p · ωi if v %i yi, i ∈ S and (ii) p · v ≥ p · ωi
if v %i xi, i /∈ S.
Proposition 3.1 Let x be a feasible allocation in the finite economy E . Then, any ob-
jection to x is justified∗ if and only if it is a Walrasian objection.
We stress that the proof of this result also shows that an equal treatment objection in
a replicated economy is justified if and only if it is a Walrasian objection. Observe that
the notion of Walrasian objection in a replicated economy does not depend explicitly on
the number of members of each type that form the coalition that objects an allocation;
what does become important is the set of types which are involved in the objection.
From the above characterization we can also deduce that when the objection (S, y)
involves all the types then it is justified∗ if and only if y is a competitive allocation in
the economy restricted to S. However, note that in general being a Walrasian objection
is much more demanding.
3.3 BMC(E) vs. B(E): a comparison
Note that the only relevant difference is the way a justified objection is defined, and
this fact has the following consequences when adapting the definition by Mas-Colell to a
sequence of replicated economies.
In our definition, we consider equal-treatment allocations and whenever an agent of
type i is assigned the commodity bundle yi within a coalition involved in an objection,
any individual of the same type i that joins a coalition for a counter-objection necessarily
needs to be assigned a bundle that improves her upon yi, independently of the number
of members of type i in the coalition.
Moreover, if rx has a justified∗ objection in rE , then the same objection is also
justified∗ in rˆE for any rˆ ≥ r. Thus, as it happens with the core, our bargaining set
4The concept of Walrasian objection requires the introduction of a price system p, and is based on
a self selection property: members that participate in a coalition in a Walrasian objection against an
allocation are those who would trade at the price vector p rather than get the consumption bundle they
receive by such an allocation.
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shrinks under replication, i.e., B((r + 1)E) ⊆ B(rE) for any natural number r. This is
not the case for the Mas-Colell’s bargaining set.5
In addition, from the characterization of justified∗ objections as Walrasian objections
we can deduce that the fact that (S, y) is a justified∗ objection to rx in rE and yi i xi
does not imply that the all the agents of type i are members of S. This is in contrast to
Mas-Colell’s notion for which if a coalition with a justified objection includes only part
of some type of agents then it is not possible for these agents to strictly improve at the
objection.
3.4 ATZ’s non-convergence example revisited
In this section, we analyze the aforementioned example by ATZ highlighting the main
differences between BMC(E) and B(E) that we have pointed out previously and the
implications regarding convergence properties. The analysis provides a different way
to prove the non-convergence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set when we replicate the
economy. On the other hand, we stress that in this example our bargaining set converges
to the set of Walrasian allocations.
Consider an economy with two consumers and two commodities. The endowments are
ω1 = (3, 1) and ω2 = (1, 3). Both consumers have the same utility function U(a, b) =
√
ab.
Given α ∈ [0, 4], let h(α) be the allocation that gives (α, α) to agents of type 1 and
(4 − α, 4 − α) to agents of type 2. Then, H = {h(α), α ∈ [√3, 4−√3]} is the set of
individually rational, Pareto optimal and equal-treatment allocations. ATZ showed that
the measure of the set of allocations in H which are not in the Mas-Colell and Zhou
bargaining sets tends to zero as the economy is replicated. Therefore, they provide a
non-convergence example for the Mas-Colell bargaining set.
In which follows we state an alternative non-convergence proof. For it, let a be
numeraire and let p denote de price of b. For each τ = r1/r2 ∈ IR+, let E|τ be the
economy restricted to r1 agents of type 1 and r2 of type 2. Some calculations show that
the Walrasian equilibrium for E|τ is given by the price p(τ) = 3τ+1τ+3 , and the allocation
which assigns x1(τ) =
(
3τ+5
τ+3
, 3τ+5
3τ+1
)
and x2(τ) =
(
5τ+3
τ+3
, 5τ+3
3τ+1
)
to agents of type 1 and 2,
respectively. Let Vi(τ) = (U(xi(τ)))
2 , for i = 1, 2. The function V1 is decreasing and
convex whereas V2 is increasing and concave.
Consider the non-Walrasian allocation xˆ given by xˆ1 = (4, 4) − x2(
√
2) and xˆ2 =
x2(
√
2). We find a unique positive number τˆ such that (U(xˆ1))
2 = V1(τˆ). Consider the
5Note that, following Mas-Colell’s approach, if we have a justified objection in the economy rE it
cannot be justified in the economy (r + 1)E .
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two types associated economy where agents of type 1 are represented by the interval
[0,1] and agents of type 2 by (1,2]. Since V1 is decreasing and xˆ is individually rational,
the set of all potential justified objections (in the sense of Mas-Colell) is given by the
interval [
√
2, τˆ ] (see figure below). Any coalition S ⊂ [0, 2] such that µ(S ∩ [0, 1]) = 1
and µ(S ∩ (1, 2]) = 1/√2 blocks fxˆ (the step function given by xˆ) via the allocation that
assigns x1(
√
2) to agents in S∩ [0, 1] and x2(
√
2) to agents in S∩ (1, 2]. This implies that
the only coalitions able to make a justified objection are those with measure 1 + 1/
√
2.
In other words, although every τ ∈ [√2, τˆ ] defines an objection to fxˆ, the unique which
is (Mas-Colell) justified is given by τ =
√
2.6 Thus we conclude that there is no justified
objection in any replicated economy, that is, rxˆ belongs to the Mas-Colell bargaining set
of rE for every r, which proves the non-convergence.
√
2 τˆ
V1
V2
Fig 1: (U(xˆ1))2 = V1(τˆ) and (U(xˆ2))2 = V2(
√
2).
Let us now analyze the previous example under our notion of bargaining set. For it,
we remark that any rational number τ ∈ [√2, τˆ] leads to a justified∗ objection for the
allocation rxˆ for some replicated economy rE . This implies that rxˆ does not belong to
our bargaining set for any large enough replicated economy.
Furthermore, for each α ∈ (√3, 4−√3), there exist τα and τα such that V1(τα) = α2
and V2(τ
α) = (4 − α)2. Note that α = 2 defines the Walrasian allocation and V1(1) =
V2(1) = 4. However, for any α 6= 2, we have τα < τα. Let α ∈ (
√
3, 2) ∪ (2, 4 − √3).
Then, V1(τ) > α
2 and V2(τ) > (4 − α)2, for any τ ∈ (τα, τα). For each rational num-
ber τ ∈ (τα, τα), let r1(τ), r2(τ) be natural numbers such that τ = r1(τ)/r2(τ). Note
that the coalition formed by r1(τ) consumers of type 1 and r2(τ) of type 2 with the
6This is so because if a coalition with a Mas-Colell justified objection includes only part of some type
of agents, then it is not possible for these agents to strictly improve with the objection.
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allocation x(τ) is a Walrasian objection to rh(α) for any replicated economy rE with
r ≥ max{r1(τ), r2(τ)}. Applying Proposition 3.1 we obtain that the objection we have
constructed is justified∗. Therefore, we conclude that the counterexample by ATZ does
not lead to a non-convergence result for the notion of bargaining set we have proposed.
Actually, since we deal with a set of economies where the equilibrium is unique, the
convergence result we state in the next section guarantees that, in this example, our
bargaining set shrinks to the Walrasian allocation when the economy is replicated.
4 A convergence result
In this section, we analyze convergence properties of our bargaining set. First we show
that under a continuity property of the equilibrium price correspondence, the Walrasian
allocations of a finite economy are characterized as allocations that belong to the bar-
gaining set of every replicated economy. Then, we state an example which shows that
such a continuity is a necessary condition.
Starting from the initial economy E , we construct auxiliary continuum economies
with a finite number of types and use the following notation. Consider a non-null vector
α = (αi, i ∈ N) ∈ [0, 1]n such that
∑
i∈N αi = 1. Let Nα = {i ∈ N |αi > 0} , nα denotes
the cardinality of Nα and mα = max {i|i ∈ Nα} . For each i ∈ Nα, let Ii(α) = [α¯i−1, α¯i)
if i 6= mα and Ii(α) = [α¯mα−1, 1] if i = mα, where α¯i =
∑i−1
h=0 αh, with α0 = 0. Finally,
Ec(α) denotes the continuum economy with nα types of agents, where consumers in the
subinterval Ii(α) are of type i (i.e, have endowments ωi and preferences %i).
Note that when determining the market-clearing prices of an economy, it is sufficient
to consider only the excess demand mappings. Let Z denote the set of excess demand cor-
respondences. Given a continuum economy, where the set of agents is represented by the
interval I = [0, 1], the measure which describes it is given by υ(F ) = µ ({t ∈ I|Zt ∈ F})
for each Borel set F ⊂ Z, being Zt the excess demand correspondence of the agent t ∈ I.7
We endow the set of measures describing the economies with the weak convergence topol-
ogy. The following continuity assumption allows us to state a convergence result for the
bargaining set we have defined.
(C) The equilibrium price mapping is continuous at the measures ηα defining the aux-
iliary continuum economies Ec(α) with a finite number of types.
7In particular, each economy Ec(α) is described by the measure ηα on Z defined by ηα(F ) =∑
i∈TF µ(Ii(α)), for each F ⊆ Z, where TF = {i ∈ N |Zi ∈ F} and Zi is excess demand correspon-
dence for consumer i in the economy E .
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Theorem 4.1 Assume that the continuity property (C) holds. Then, an allocation is
Walrasian in the finite economy E if and only if it belongs to the bargaining set of every
replicated economy. That is,
W (E) =
⋂
r∈IN
B(rE).
Recall that the set of economies (described by measures, as above) on which the
equilibrium price correspondence is continuous is open and dense. (See Dierker, 1973, or
Hildenbrand, 1974). Regardless of the continuity of the equilibrium mapping holds for a
residual set of economies, we know from the Debreu-Mantel-Sonnenschein theorem that
we cannot hope to get more structure on the set of equilibria unless we state additional
strong assumptions.
Then, the continuity property we require to get convergence is a limitation for our
result. In spite of this, since the Walrasian correspondence is upper semicontinuous (see
Hildenbrand and Mertens, 1972), uniqueness of Walrasian equilibrium guarantees that
our convergence theorem holds. Therefore, as we detail below, we find assumptions on
the primitives of the original economy E that ensure condition (C) holds and, in turn
convergence of our bargainind set.
If the aggregate excess demand function satisfies the gross substitutes property8, the
Walrasian equilibrium is unique (up to normalization of the equilibrium price vector)
and globally stable (see Arrow and Hahn, 1971, for additional details). Note that if the
individual demand satisfies the gross substitute property9 (an increase in the price of
good increases the demand for every other good) for all consumers, then individual and
aggregate excess demand functions also satisfy it.
Moreover, a sufficient condition for satisfaction of the gross substitutes condition afore-
mentioned is that agents have C2 and separable utility functions with the Arrow-Pratt
measure of relative risk aversion that is everywhere less than one (see Varian, 1985).
Furthermore, it follows from a result of Mityushin and Polterovich (1978) that if agents
have strictly concave utility functions with relative risk aversion that is everywhere less
than four10 and if their endowments are collinear (that is, the distribution of income
is price-independent), then equilibrium is unique (see Mas-Colell, 1991, for a discussion
8Z satisfies the gross substitute if p ≥ q and ph = qh for some h, then Zh(p) ≥ Zh(q) and, if
Z(p) = Z(q), then p = q. Other related property is the weak axiom of revealed preference that says
that if pZ(q) ≤ 0 and qZ(p) ≤ 0, then Z(q) = Z(p). If the economy is regular, this implies that the
equilibrium is unique.
9The standard example is a demand that comes from the maximization of a Cobb-Douglas utility
function subject to a budget constraint with strictly positive endowments. A generalization is the utility
function U(x) =
∏`
h=1 (xh − βh)γh , with βh ≤ 0, γh > 0 and
∑`
h=1 γh = 1.
10This property can be looked at as a concrete expression of the idea that the substitution effects
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of this result and of uniqueness generally). In addition, Fisher (1972) showed that if all
goods are normal (income elasticities nonnegative), then a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for an utility function to yield individual demand functions with the gross substitute
property is that, for every pair of commodities, the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitu-
tion exceeds the greater of the two income elasticities. Thus, in a two-commodity world
with homothetic preferences, gross substitution obtains if the elasticity of substitution
is everywhere larger than 1. Finally, we also remark that, under strictly convexity and
monotonicity of preferences, if the initial endowment is a Walrasian allocation, then this
is the unique equilibrium allocation.
If the economy E verifies the aforementioned conditions, we have uniqueness of equi-
librium for all the auxiliary economies Ec(α); and therefore we have convergence of the
bargaining set. Next, we state an example that illustrates why the continuity assumption
(C) is required and shows the impossibility of obtaining a convergence result if we allow
for discontinuities of the equilibrium correspondence.
Counterexample. Let E be an exchange economy with two commodities and two
agents, endowed with ω1 = (2, 1) and ω2 = (1, 2) respectively, who have the same utility
function U , defined as follows:
U(x, y) =

1
21/4
√
x+
√
y if x >
√
2 y, and
√
x+ (2− 21/4)√y if x ≤ √2 y.
Let x be the numeraire, let p denote the price of y and let di(p) be the demand function
for each agent i. The equilibrium price for this economy is p∗ = 2− 21/4.
Consider ri agents of type i = 1, 2 and let τ = r1/r2. The Walrasian equilibrium prices
for this restricted replicated economy, E(τ), are
p(τ) =

21/4
√
2τ+1
τ+2
if τ > τ ∗,[
p, p
]
if τ = τ ∗, and
(2− 21/4)
√
2τ+1
τ+2
if τ < τ ∗,
where τ ∗ = 1 + 3
2
√
2, p = 21/4(2− 21/4) and p = √2. Note that there is a continuum
of equilibria for the restricted economy E(τ ∗) and a unique equilibrium for any other
economy E(τ) with τ 6= τ ∗. For each τ ∈ IR+, the utility levels which can be attained for
each type of consumers at a Walrasian allocation of the economy E(τ) are given by the
mappings Vi(τ) = U(di(p(τ))), i = 1, 2, whose graphical representations are shown in
the following figure, where αi = min{Vi(τ ∗)} and βi = max{Vi(τ ∗)} :
dominate the income effects.
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τ∗
α1
β1
α2
β2
V2
V1
τ
V
i(
τ
)
Fig. 2: V1 and V2 are not lower semicontinuous at τ∗.
Consider a feasible allocation h = (h1, h2) such that U(hi) ∈ (αi, βi).11 Since h is
individually rational, in order to block it in a replicated economy, both types need to be
present. In addition, there is no justified∗ objection for h whenever τ > τ ∗ or τ < τ ∗. It
is possible, though, to find justified∗ objections in E(τ ∗). Let pi be the equilibrium price
for E(τ ∗) such that U(di(pi)) = U(hi). As illustrated in the figure below, any price in
[p2, p1] ⊂
[
p, p
]
leads to a justified∗ objection. However, since τ ∗ is an irrational number,
such set of justified∗ objections cannot be attained in any replicated economy, which
proves the non-convergence.
p2 p1
U(h2)
U(h1)
V ∗1
V ∗2
Fig. 3: We get V ∗i (p) = U(di(p)), with p ∈ p(τ∗) by “zooming in” on the Fig. 2 when τ = τ∗.
11For instance, we can take h1 =
(
112
52(3−21/4)2
, 11
2
52(3−21/4)2
)
and h2 = (3, 3)− h1.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Let (S, y) be a Walrasian objection to x. Assume that it is
counter-objected in some replicated economy rE . That is, there exist T ⊆ N and natural
numbers ri ≤ r for each i ∈ T , such that:
∑
i∈T rizi ≤
∑
i∈T riωi; zi i yi for every i ∈ T ∩ S
and zi i xi for every i ∈ T \ S. Since (S, y) is a Walrasian objection at prices p we have
that p · zi > p · ωi, for every i ∈ T ∩ S and p · zi > p · ωi, for every i ∈ T \ S. This implies
p ·∑i∈T rizi > p ·∑i∈T riωi, which is a contradiction. Thus, we conclude that (S, y) is a
justified∗ objection.
To show the converse, let (S, y) be a justified∗ objection to x and let a = (a1, . . . , an) be
an allocation such that ai = yi if i ∈ S and ai = xi if i /∈ S. For every i define Γi = {z ∈
IR`|z + ωi %i ai}
⋃{0} and let Γ be the convex hull of the union of the sets Γi, i ∈ N. A similar
proof to the limit theorem on the core by Debreu and Scarf (1963) shows that Γ
⋂
(−IR`++) is
empty, which implies that 0 is a frontier point of Γ. Then, there exists a price system p such
that p · z ≥ 0 for every z ∈ Γ. Therefore, we conclude that (S, y) is a Walrasian objection.
Q.E.D.
To proof Theorem 4.1 we show the following lemma.
Lemma. Let x be a non-Walrasian feasible allocation in the economy E . Then, the following
statements hold:
(i) For each i, there exist a sequence of rational numbers rki ∈ (0, 1] converging to 1 and
a sequence of allocations (xk, k ∈ IN) that converges to x such that: (a) ∑ni=1 rki xki ≤∑n
i=1 r
k
i ωi, (b) x
k
i i xi for every i, and (c) xki i xk+1i for every k and every i.
Let rk =
∑
i∈N r
k
i and α
k = (rki /r
k, i ∈ N) ∈ [0, 1]n. Let fk be the step function given by
fk(t) = xki for every t ∈ Ii(αk) in the continuum economy Ec(αk).
(ii) If x belongs to the bargaining set of every replicated economy, then for every k, there is
a justified objection (Sk, gk), in the sense of Mas-Colell, to fk in the economy Ec(rk).
Let γk =
(
γki = µ(S
k ∩ Ii(rk))/µ(Sk), i ∈ N
) ∈ [0, 1]n. Let νk be the measure describing the
auxiliary continuum economy Ec(γk).
(iii) There exists a subsequence of measures of νk which converges weakly to a measure ν
describing a limit economy Eˆc.
Proof of (i). Observe that if xk converges to x and xki i xi, for every i and k, then, under
continuity of preferences, condition (c) holds by taking a subsequence if necessary.
If x is a feasible allocation that is not Pareto optimal, then, for every i, there exists yi such
that
∑n
i=1 yi ≤
∑n
i=1 ωi and yi i xi. The sequence given by xki = 1kyi + (1 − 1k )xi fulfills the
requirements in (a) with rki = 1 for all i and k.
Let x be a non-Walrasian feasible allocation which is efficient. Then, there exist rational
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numbers ai ∈ (0, 1] (with aj < 1 for some j) and bundles yi for all i = 1, . . . , n, such that∑n
i=1 ai(yi − ωi) = −δ, with δ ∈ IR`++ and yi i xi, for every i (see Herve´s-Beloso and Moreno-
Garc´ıa, 2001, for details). Let a =
∑n
i=1 ai. Given ε ∈ (0, 1], let yεi = εyi + (1 − ε)xi. By
convexity of preferences, yεi i xi for every i. Consider xεi = xi + εδaε , where aε = (1− ε)(n− a).
By monotonicity, xεi i xi for every i. Take a sequence of rational numbers εk converging
to zero and, for each k and i, let aki = (1 − εk)(1 − ai), rki = ai + aki ∈ (0, 1], and define
xki =
ai
rki
yεki +
aki
rki
xεki . By construction, the sequences r
k
i and x
k
i (i = 1, . . . , n and k ∈ IN) verify
the required properties.
Proof of (ii). Let qk be a natural number such that rki = b
k
i /q
k, with bki ∈ IN for each
i. Since x ∈ ⋂r∈INB(rE), xk cannot be a Walrasian allocation for the economy formed by
bki agents of type i; otherwise, the coalition formed by b
k
i members of each type i joint with
xk would define a justified∗ objection in the qk-replicated economy.12 Then, fk cannot be a
competitive allocation in Ec(rk). By Mas-Colell’s (1989) equivalence result, fk is blocked by a
justified objection (Sk, gk) in Ec(rk). By convexity of preferences, we can consider without loss
of generality that gk is an equal-treatment allocation.
Proof of (iii). Since the number of types of consumers we deal with is finite, without loss of
generality we can consider, taking a subsequence if necessary, that T k = {i ∈ N |γki > 0} = T
for every k. We use the same notation for such a subsequence and write γki converges to γi
for every i ∈ T and ∑i∈T γi = 1. Consider Ec(γ) and let (Zi, i ∈ T ) be the excess demand
correspondences of the types that are actually present in every economy Ec(γk). Let us define
τ(F ) = {i ∈ T |Zi ∈ F} for each F ⊂ Z. We deduce that
lim
k→∞
νk(F ) = lim
k→∞
∑
i∈τ(F )
γˆki =
∑
i∈τ(F )
γi = ν(F ),
Therefore, νk converges weakly to ν that is the measure describing the economy Ec(γ).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.1 Since W (E) ⊆ C(rE), it is immediate that W (E) ⊆ ⋂r∈INB(rE).
To show the converse, assume that x is a non-Walrasian allocation that belongs to the
bargaining set of every replicated economy. By the previous lemma, for each natural number
k, there is a subset T of types and a competitive equilibrium (pk, gk) in Ec(rk) such that:
(i) gki %i xki for every i ∈ T, with gkj j xkj for some j ∈ T, and
(ii) gki ∈ di(pk) for every i ∈ T, and xki %i di(pk) for every i ∈ N \ T.13
Let Ak =
{
i /∈ T |xi %i di(pk)
}
, Bk =
{
i /∈ T |xi ≺i di(pk)
}
. Since the number of types is
finite, without loss of generality we can consider, taking a subsequence if it is necessary, that
Ak = A and Bk = B for every k.
12We remark that any objecting coalition involving all types along with a Walrasian allocation for
such a coalition defines a justified∗ objection. This is not the case for the corresponding Mas-Colell’s
notion.
13Note that, given a price vector p, all the bundles in di(p) are indifferent; thus, when we write
z %i di(p) it means z %i d for every d ∈ di(p).
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Consider the sequence of economies Ec(γk), as constructed in the previous lemma, described
by the sequence of measures νk that converges weakly to ν. Let us choose a sequence of numbers
δk ∈ (0, 1) converging to 1 and let εk = 1 − δk, which converges to zero. For each i ∈ B take
εki > 0 such that ε
k =
∑
i∈B ε
k
i . Let T1 = T ∪B and for each i ∈ T1 define γ˜ki ∈ (0, 1) as follows:
γ˜ki =
 δkγ
k
i if i ∈ T
εki if i ∈ B
Note that
∑
i∈T1 γ˜
k
i = 1. For each k, consider the continuum economy Ec(γ˜k) and let ν˜k denote
the measures on Z describing it. Note that limk→∞ γ˜ki = limk→∞ γˆki = γi for every i ∈ T and
γ˜ki goes to zero as k increases for every i ∈ B. Then, the economy Ec(γ˜k) differs from Ec(γk)
only in at most a finite set of types of agents whose measure goes to zero when k increases.
Therefore, the sequence of measures ν˜k also converges weakly to ν.
Now, for each k and for each i ∈ T1 = T ∪ B, take a sequence of positive rational numbers
rkmi converging to γ˜
k
i when m increases and such that
∑
i∈T1 r
km
i = 1 for every m. In this way,
for each k, let us consider the sequence of continuum economies Ec(rkm). To simplify notation,
let Ekkc = Ec(rkk). Note that limk→∞ rkki = limk→∞ γki for every i ∈ T and limk→∞ rkki = 0 for
every i ∈ B. Then, the sequence of measures measures νkk that describes the diagonal sequence
of economies Ekkc converges weakly to ν as well.
Then, by the continuity of the equilibrium mapping at ν and the continuity of preferences,
we deduce that for every k large enough there is an equilibrium price p˜k1 for the economy Ekkc
such that di(p˜
k
1) i xi for every i ∈ T1. If xi %i di(p˜k1) for every i ∈ A, we have found a Walrasian
objection to x in a replicated economy, which is in contradiction to the fact that x belongs to
the bargaining set of every replicated economy. Otherwise, let A˜k =
{
i /∈ T1|xi %i di(p˜k1)
}
,
B˜k =
{
i /∈ T1|xi ≺i di(p˜k1)
}
. As before, without loss of generality, taking a subsequence if it
is necessary, we can consider A˜k = A˜ and B˜k = B˜ for every k. Let T2 = T1 ∪ B˜ and repeat
the analogous argument. In this way, after a finite number h of iterations, we have either (i)
Th = N = {1, . . . , n} or (ii) N \ Th 6= ∅ but
{
i /∈ Th|xi ≺i di(p˜kh)
}
= ∅. If (i) occurs we find a
justified∗ objection to x in a replicated economy which involves all the types of agents. If (ii)
is the case, there is also a justified∗ objection to x in a replicated economy but involving only
a strict subset of types. In any situation we obtain a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
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